ANONYMOUS LETTER ON BRADDOCK'S CAMPAIGN 1
(A.L.)
1
There is no endorsement or hint of the authorship of this violent letter, an example of the backbiting that was practised in the British army before Cumberland became captain general. The handwriting is the same as the scribe's who wrote St. Clair's letter (p. 102). The author was obviously an officer of sufficient rank to learn Dunbar's and Halkett's secrets, provided his comments are taken at face value; he is exact when entioning provisions, transport, and such matters as fall within a quartermaster's province. It is possible that he may have been Captain Gabriel Christie, who assisted St. Clair on this expedition and had his strong support. Christie became deputy quartermaster general, a general in the army, and proprietor of Isle aux Noix in the Richelieu River.
Wills's Creek 25th July 1755.
Sir,
When everybody's expectation was rased to the highest pitch, Concerning the expidition under the Command of General Braddock in
America, those who were under his Command, and gave attention to
his proceeding, forsaw, what must happen (if any opposition should be
made by the Enemy) from the measures taken, and was sorry, so good
natured a man should be so much misled by a favourite, or two, who,
realy had not much experience and were very ignorant of the detail of
an Army, how much depend on the Oeconemy [Economy] and Just
regulation of every Branch; therefore I presume to lay before you the following remarks,
as well as facts, which Can be attested by many,
in doing which, I have endeavour'd to advance nothing but what Consists with my own knowledge, or that of the best Authority; neither have I attempted to
give any reason for our bad Success to any other person in Europe, as it would not only
be great presumption, but likewise improper; notwithstanding, I shall always think it my Duty to lay before you every Truth,
Consisting with my own knowledge, especially things of so much importance to his Majesty and to the Publick,
therefore shall make no other Apology for this long narration which I beg your patience to read
as something may bemention'd which is overlook'd in othe accounts;I know pains have been taken
by some (who were deeply Concern'd) to dress up an Account to excuse their own folly, presumption
and manifest ill Conduct:but in Spite of every Gloss Truth will remain and the more the
operation of this Expedition is inquired into and the Conduct from the time of devideing the army
to the fatal 9th of July and for three days after things will appear the worse and most deserveing
the severest Censure.
About the 18th of June General Braddock march'd from the Little Meadows with a detachmen[t] of above 1200 men besides officers as will appear by the inclosed return exclusive of Bat-men Waggoners
and other followers of an Army—he took with him the best part of the Artillery tho' the Amunition was not more than make one days fireing if there had been occasion again[st] a fort. Also fifty Waggons loaded with different things, to each of which he had six of the best horses—
and 400 more horses with back loads of flower &c. and about 100 spare horses—after which he had a supply sent him of one hundred loads of flow'r—upwards of 100 fine fat Oxen and a number of sheep which all joind the day before the action, Consequently fell into the hands of the french.
After all this was fix'd he left Colonel Dunbar with the remainder of the Army to bring 357 Waggons after him, besides 200 back loads and horses only for 100; the Weakest and worst of the horses were left with C. Dunbar and the proportion run to be Just Three Waggons to one sett of bad horses—partly oweing to the number of spare ones the General had taken as before mention'd—so you may Judge of the slowness of Col. Dunbars motions marching a little way one day with onesett,
then sending Back for another sett &c. therefore every days march (as to distance) took up three days dureing which time neither man nor beast had any rest and the latter no meat but the leaves of Trees—this way of going on together with the Genls hurry from the little Meadows brought Colonel Dunbar to be near fifty miles in the Genls, rear on the day of action. To give you an accot of which that will intirely agree with every other, is almost impossible, as most officers, as well as men,
differ, in Triffleing Circumstances and even in a few material ones—however the Conducting of the Whole from the beginning might have been retrieved had not a final Issue been put to all by what happen'd last.
[Text]
On the 9th of July Lt Col. Gage Commanded two Companys of Grs [Grenadiers] which was by way of an advance Guard2 to the main body under the General as well as for Covering a working party then Cuting the Road under Sr Jo: St. Clair's [[pronounced Sinclair]] dirrection about two o'Clock that day, after Crossing the River Call'd Monanganhely where a Plantation of one fraser had been and within six or seven miles of the french fort Call'd du Queesny (or Kane) and within 3 quarters of mile of the Crossing at frasers house—on the Fort Side of Turtle-Creek—The advance Party was attack'd rather from a riseing ground by a party of Indians and french in Indian dress. The Number of the Enemy by those who makes the largest allowance did not appear to be above
2 The advance party was larger than this. It had 300 men, including the grenadier company, a detachment from the 44th regiment, and half of Horatio Gates's New York independent company.
Three hundred and others dont scruple to say did not exceed one hundred. The first fire of the Enemy was on the left of the advance Guard which Gradualy Came to the front and extended to their Right something like a halfmoon, which kill'd about 10 or Twelve Grenadeers—this alarm'd them a little and they return'd the fire, notwithstanding they did not see the Enemy—which was return'd tho not in a regular manner, but like Poping shots, with little explosion, only a kind of Whiszing noise;(which is a proof the Enemys Arms were riffle Barrels) this kind of fire was attended with Considerable execution,
which soon put the Grenadeers in some disorder and on the Continuance of the Enemys fire the advance Guard was repuls'd but were suported by the
Working party in their Rear, which afterwards Joind in the disorder; dureing which time,
General Braddock was with the main body about a Quarter of a mile in their Rear—upon
the alarm of the advance fire, the General immediately rode to the front and his
aid-du-camps after him, some officers after them, and more men without any form or order
but that of a parcell of school boys Coming out of s[c]hool—and in an instant,
Blue, buff and yellow were intermix'd. Soon after an order was given to the main body to move on
(that is, those who keep'd at their post) without any form or order, but
that the line of march which is four deep faced to the Right or left
as occasion might be, with an intention to separate on each side of the
road to march Two deep according to his original plan of march a
Copey of which I send you inclosed (before I proceed I have only one
obvious observation to make on the line of march—which as I before
said is 4 deep, instread of three the Usual way—which marches by files —only divides on each side of the line of Waggons, baggage &c. in the
Center. Consequently their is a file of two deep on each side of the
Waggons on the march but what I'm going to observe, is, that when
the Battalion is Compleated (if I may be allow'd the expression) at
their respective posts where they were order'd to remain—therefore
when the Battalion is faced to the right by files 4 deep—the officers are
all on the left flank—if to the left the Contrary—Consequently they're
always upon one side—therefore when ever you Come to devide on the
Center on each side of the Waggons and have occassion to form the
line—the officers are every one to one Wing—without a single officer
to the other. this was a Constant practice with us notwithstanding of
the most evident absurdity) but to proceed—one officer, indeed says, he
had orders from an aid du camp to double his front, instead of four,
to march eight in front, as if one was going to a ttack a breach—however I believe this was meant only to keep the line of march, in which
order the main body moved, without the least dirrection to officer or
man but "March on my lads and keep up your fire["] when he Came
up with the repuls'd party after passing with difficulty the line of Waggons, Baggage, Cattle &c. in their front together with the Artillery, all
which occupy'd the space between the main body And the advance or
van Guard3 or Party whos[e] Confusion had some effect on them and
occasion'ed their throwing away their fire without seeing the Enemy,
which was return'd by them in the manner before describ'd with some
execution: but our own fire did much more, however both together
Contributed not a little to a general disorder; after which, The General would have Changed his disposition (or more properly made one)
but the Men were then turn'd stupid and insensible and would not
obey their officers in makeing the intended movements which were
unhappily too late attempted. The officers behaved extremely well as
possibly Could be, which fact is strengthen'd by the number of kill'd
3 "There were no other van Guard to the Army but Co. Gage's party tho the
contrary has been said in some Accts. sent home." [Marginal note.]
and Wounded—tho' I'm sorry to say the men are accused of misbehaviour, not with standing of the number of kill'd and wounded among
them, which is Great, Considering the number of Effectives in the field:but I Can't help thinking their
misbehaviour is exaggerated, in order to palliate the Blunders made by those in the dirrection, as they
make no allowance for regular Troops being surprised, as was manifestly the Case here, and no manner of disposition made—but one of Certain destruction—in
these Circumstances it has generaly I beleive been the Case—misbehaviour. its the general opinion
more were kill'd by our own Troops than by the Enemy particularly C. Tatton—by the Grenadiers. The
Rear Guard (tho' onlya Caps. Command) did more execution than the whole, among the Enemy, as the officer
had time to recolect himself Consequently made a dispossition and extended his Guard in advantageous posts
behind trees by which he both repuls'd and kill'd a great number. The Ground was extraordinary good when
Compared to the rest of the Country. The Trees were high very open and little or no underwood—nor
Can any reason be given why they allow'd us to Cross the Monanganhela 3/4 of a mile from the Attack—
where the banks were vastly high and the most advantageous post for them they possibly Could have, except it
was, to lull us in Security, that we had no Enemy, which was too generaly beleived, on the whole march, and that
the Fort would be found abandon'd; there was nothing of Entrenchments—Swivvel-Guns &c. &c. as
some officers and several men affirm—which from the best information has no foundation but in their own Brain.
Scarce an officer or soldier Can say they ever saw at one time six of the Enemy and the greatest part never saw a
Single man of the Enemy.—Col. Gage who Commanded the advance party and distinguish'd himself by Encouraging
the men as much as he Could and after they were broke, in rallying them, says, were he put to his oath he Could
not say he saw above one french or Indian dureing the action—he had several narrow escapes by shots
through both hat &
Coat and one which Grased on his belly but did not break the skin,
there were a few french and some Indians the french mostly in the Indian dress not withstand[ing] several were
seen in the french uniform—particularly by some who were left in the field of Battle and Crawl'd off
afterwards, saw the french take possession of our Guns and over sett some from the Carridges, likewise
overturn some of the Waggons,
which they scarce would have done had they expected to keep the field; another Circumstance to prove they
were not strong of Indians and that they doubted likewise of Success, is, that they never begin scalping,
if sure of victory 'till all is over; on the other hand, if the
affair is doubtful or if they're sure of being beat they begin scalping whenever opportunity offers, as
soon as they've kill'd their Man—in this late affair, they scalp'd some very early. I dont apprehend
they knew the General was there with the main body, at first—besides they knew very well Col. Dunbar
with a strong body was behind him, but they never beleived so much as fifty miles—which even few or
none of our own officers knew or imagin'd except the General himself and his people, as he had made several
remonstrances to the former of his situation to no manner of purpose—the above reasons I give for the
Enemys hurry and why they did not pursue, Cross the River, which only a few Indian sattempted, but retired
agen; it was very natural to imagine,
there was a reserve there and that Regular Troops would rally again and return to the field and retake what
they lost which I believe might eassily have been done;I dont pretend to be a Judge, but submit my Opinion,
if it was not a great error in the General to march his whole body without a dispossition to support an
advance Party and without leaveing himself a Reserve? whereas, when he found the Advance Guard attack'd
had he halted and spoke to the Officers and Men—told them what they might expect and what they
were to do, at the same time detach'd some men to support those attack'd but what was more matterial to
[sic] made a dispossition and form'd his own line likewise detach'd 100 men on each flank where the attack
was to have march'd round the Enemy, which he had time enough to have done, but none of these Steps nor any
other but those before mention'd were taken,
which occasion'd a Total defeat. The Genl and the rest with him, retreated about 43 miles before ever they thought of sending any accot to C. Dunbar at last they did from Guests Settlement within seven miles where Col. Dunbars Camp was, at that time—for him to send up some fresh Troops, for a rear Guard, likewise some flower—Amunition &c. and some Empty Waggons for the Sick and Wounded which was accordingly done the 11th the same day all Join'd Col. Dunbar. The General in the Action received a Shot in the Arm which went through & penetrated his body and tho' I am, and every other person perswaided he was in no Condition to be spoke to or to give orders—notwithstanding, in the Generals name, was orders given to destroy everything in Colonel Dunbar's Camp Provisions of all kinds—upwards of 150 Waggons all the Artillery Stores of every kind and even some officers Baggage &c. &c. &c. The Confusion, hurry and Conflagration attending all this, Cannot be describ'd, but I Can assure you it affected everybody who had the least sense of the Honour of His Majesty or the Glory of England at heart, in the deepest manner.
Scandlous as the action was, more Scandlous was the base and hurried Retreat, with the immense destruction and expense to the Nation—what was lost in the Action with what was destroy'd afterwards by ourselves, amounted upon a moderate Calculation to near Three hundred Thoussand pounds value besides the loss of Blood &c. We Carried with the sweat of our Brows, a pritty Train of Artillery up to the fIrench, which they never Could have obtain'd otherwise. The other part, and the Greatest, which we destroy'd ourselves might have been saved perhaps, if things had been left to the management of Col.
Dunbar, who for private animosity's &c. never was Consulted—but the most absurd orders given in his Camp under the Genls sanction tho' as I before said from good reasons was thought Could not be Consulted—how far the adviser's or dirrectors Can answer to God their Country or their own Conscience I shall not determine. I shall Conclude this Account by telling you the grossest mismanagement has been in this expedition from our landing to our Defeat as every officer except (perhaps) a few, must own on inquiry—happy for our Troops they were not pursued or not a single soul Could have been Saved.
In the time of the Action, The General behaved with a great deal of Personal Courage, which everybody must allow—but thats all that Can be said—he was a Man of Sense and good natur'd, too tho' Warm and a little uncooth in his manner—and Peevish—with all very indolent and seem'd glad for anybody to take bussiness off his hands, which may be one reason why he was so grossly imposed upon, by his favourite—who realy Dirrected everything and may Justly be said to've Commanded the Expedition and the Army.
On the 13th after the before mention'd destruction we all March'd—I mean Join'd the Genl in his Retreat—before we had moved far (with Waggons only for the Sick and Wounded) it was discover'd The Train had reserved a Waggon with Powder and Seven Cohorns on which a halt was order'd and Cap:Dobson of Col. Dunbars Regt.
who was an acting under aid du camp from the time C. Orme was Wounded—order'd the Pioneers to be got together—and a hole to be Dug—a little off the road—in sight of the Army—Waggoners—Indian Traders &c &c—where the Cohorns were burried— Who gave him such orders I Cant say but they were accordingly Comply'd with, without any order in Writeing, at this time the Genl was within a few hours of his Death. This Gentlemans activity in the intrest of C. Orme recommended him so strongley that he was to have been Lt. Colonel to a Regt. form'd from the Independent Companys of which its said Lt.
Col. Burton was to be the Colonel—but since the Generals Death Dobson ask'd leave of Col. Dunbar to sell his Commission for £1500 to a Lieut.—how far he'll succeed at home is another question. on Sunday the 13 we Came to an encampment within a few miles of the Great Crossing of the Yauchnaganey at whichPlace Genl. Braddock still Continued to give orders 'till he expired at nine o Clock same night,
and was burried next morning on the high road, that the Army might march over, to deface anymarks of a Grave, after which Col. Dunbar took upon him the Command and try'd every method to stop a Licentious Spirit in the Troops—and nothing but the want of powers prevents him makeing examples of some—no person Could Come to a Command under more disadvantages—as he knows nothing of His Majestys intentions nor of Genl. Braddocks instructions—as every paper was lost at the Action, neither Can he obtain any particular in-formation from C. Orme.
When Genl. Braddock landed in America, affairs were by no means in readiness for him, as he expected;Virginia was a bad place, to be supplied in—Pensilvania was infinitely better, but we never had recourse there, 'till repeated dissapointments obliged us—a vast deal of time, was spent to little purpose, waiting for Carridges, horses &c, & in laying up a Magazine at Wills's Creek of salt provisions flower &.
more than possibly we Could have occasion for—between 7 and Ten Thoussand bushells of Oats were laid in, tho' none Issued out, to Enable the horses to go on, in their march (which Oats since the Generals Death, C. Orme gave orders to Sell agen as they were the Generals property—but Col. Dunbar has interposed and will not permit it, as he says they are the Publicks). there were about 300 Waggons hyred at 13sh[?] Currency or 10sh English money a day, with 4 horses to each Waggon with the value of horses and Waggons ascertain'd if not return'd to the owners—600 back load horses at two shillings a day each—Waggons and horses immensly loaded and little food on the Ground but leaves of Trees—more followers and attendants on this little Army than would have serv'd an Army of 20,000 Men in flanders; a Licentiousness which prevail'd among the Troops, in Consequence of being
told, Genl. Braddock was sure of there good behaviour in the day of action, therefore would dispense with the Ceremonial part of Duty—it's impossible to express the bad effects of this hint—those who were inclin'd to be more exact were not more in favour on that acct never one Deserter punish'd—The Army never seen by the Genl. but once Comeing along the line as Comr in Cheif;add to all this, The Pride,
Insolence and overbearing Spirit of the first aid du camp C. Orme—despersing all former military orders ordinances and Customs of an
Army in flanders or anywhere else either in old, or latter times, Commanding and dictateing to every Branch from the lowest to the highest and no bounds of Resentment Again[st] those who would not Bow to
Dagon and who had resolution enough to tell him the bad Consequences attending such measures which (to our misfortune) he had always influence enough, to obtain The Generals sanction to.
The heads of both military and Civil Branches with us were despised as ignorant &c and if ever their opinions were ask'd (which was rarely)
after a Sneer at them—the Contrary was sure to be follow'd. Poor Sr Peter Halket who behaved in the late action with the greatest bravery and Coolness—divided his men and fired some platoons by his own Dirrection, before he was kill'd; at the very time, he was approveing of the fire his Men had made before, and biding them do the same again—he was shot through the body. This Gentlemen who had before, given proofs of his abilitys as a Soldier and Confirm'd it by his Death, yet was publickly told—"he was a fool, he wanted leading strings" of which facts there are many Evidences—for sometime before he died, he was in Disgrace—and the reasons he gave himself for it was, for his adviseing to train some people to the Great Guns as we had so few who understood that branch, likewise dissaproveing of the Line of March and proposeing to build block houses or stockades at proper passes for Magazines both for places of security as well as to encumberour March the less with Carridges—for giveing this advice he was told it was foolish and too much presumption—this fact I had from Sr Peters own mouth—and the same he mention'd to several others—after which he neither was Consulted nor did he ever go near the Genl. but once when he was sent for about some storrie that had been Carried to the Genl. that he and some others were liveing well when their officers wanted, at which time Sr Peter only had the King's salt provisions and Could get no other—not withstanding he was threaten'd with his Regt. and advised to take Care of himself—to which he answer'd he did not depend on it for a livelyhood—and had not his honour been Concern'd he never would have Come on the Expedition.
Col. Dunbar one day, giveing his Opinion (when ask'd) with a good deal of reason and instanceing the practise of Great Genls. he had served under &c. was told in presence of Genl. Braddock, by Cap:Orme that it was Stuff) and that he might as well talk of his Grand-Mother to which C. Dunbar reply'd with some Warmth Sr "if she was alive, she would have more sense, more good manners, and know as much of military matters as you do—on which the General interposed and said,
Gentlemen you are both Warm—to which Dunbar answer'd—"General,
you See the Provocation I got—so it ended then—but his opinion was never ask'd for the future. I forgot to mention, at Will's Creek, The Genl. desired Orme to be admited into the Council of War—which was accordingly done, but Sr Peter finding how everything went, as he dirrected he desired every body might afterwards sign their opinion—this gave great offence, so they had no more Councils—Sr Peter declared if ever he Came to ye Command he would dismiss C. Orme next day from the Army and regreted much that the General had such a man about him who's advice would both be the ruin of the General & the Expedition.
As to what is before mention'd about C. Dunbar he repeated it when it happen'd and has often mention'd it since. Soon after this the makeing of the Detachment and devideing the Army was plan'd and beleived by everybody—it was done with a Design to vex C. Dunbar, who realy was very much embarrass'd with such a number of Carridges &c and many other Difficultys—but haveing no orders how to act he sent for instructions but Could obtain no other—but that he must do the best,
and to be on his Guard, as he might expect to be made answerable for his Conduct &c. with several other threatning expressions and ordering him not to tease the General with Complaints which sometimes Came at unseasonable hours, dureing the Seperation, every method was taken to embarrass (to appearance) Col. Dunbar—by sending orders to forward to the Genl. every thing that Could be thought of. C. Dunbars Complaints at last became so well grounded that the General order'd 40 horses to be sent back to him but such methods were taken that only the useless and those near their end were sent—so that only 16, of the 40
was able to Join Dunbar. The General at parting told Col. Dunbar, he would always keep within three hours march of him—at last when he advanced a Considerable distance, he was heard to say he beleived he would be obliged to bring to—till C. Dunbar Join'd him—but that was opposed by C. Orme and orders were then sent to Col. Dunbar to Join the General, the best way he Could with the Convoy at Fort du Queesny (or Kane), which at the rate he was obliged to go on at Could not have been before Septemr. They say the principle Councellor with Orme was Lt Col. Burton who was privy to everything, but this, I Can't affirm,
from authority sufficient for you to depend on. When the General separated with his detachment both Regts were pick'd and Cull'd without the knowledge either of Sr Peter Halket or Col.Dunbar and the officers names mention'd in publick orders without regard either to tour of Duty—health—fitness or anything else but Just as the projectors pleased (which C. Orme Call'd a new Scheme proper for the Army to follow)
after the separation, it then—I mean the part of Col. Dunbars Regt.—lost its name, and was Call'd Col. Burtons detachment, which in short began to do wonders, and all in a few days, which it seems was intirely oweing to Col. Burton—but unluckily in praiseing one so much they depress'd the other and took every opportunity to find fault with Sr Peters detachment in order to sett off the other—matters run high,
from a dryness among the officers to an indifference and Jelous'y which at last reach'd the men and where it would have ended, if it had more time to Operate in, is hard to tell, but the general Calamity put an end to that; and the remaining part of the Two Regiments heartily agree,
in the neglect of Duty, dissobedience of orders, mutinous dispossitions,
worse than any Militia I eversaw, Cowardly principles, frighten'd now almost at their own shaddows, or the name of an Indian, partly perhaps from the hurry we were in by a general destruction of everything, as well as from their own inclinations; Plunder was the word at the Battle,
as well as afterwards, but it was plundering ourselves—this is a bad picture of Soldiers and such I'm tyred of, which nothing but the stricktest discipline and greatest severity Can possibly reclaim and I beleive they're now in very good hands, I meanin Col. Dunbars if he knew his power which Cap. Orme has taken Care to keep him in the Dark about, and took every method from the beginning to ruin him and make him uneassy, and even since the Generals Death seems equally determin'd to frustrate C. Dunbars designs at least as far as is in his power to do.
In Nine days from the time we Retreated after the Junction of the Genl. we arrived at Wills' Creek where we now are—but Col. Dunbar soon proposes to move to Philidelphia with the Kings Troops 'till he receives orders from England. Pity it was that the Genl. (even after his Retreat) when he Join'd C. Dunbar—instead of destroying the valueable stores & provisions & makeing a shameful flight—notwithstanding their was not one Indian or frenchman in pursute—did not determine on building a stockade at Guests or the Great Crossing where their was fine Ground—in which Case it would have Secured the Fronteers—and been a Cheque on the Enemy our being so far advanced in the Country;
we destroy'd provision enough, which, without any supply would have lasted us all, these six months.
Which way all the Accots and Contracts will be settled here is hard to tell but their is an immense sum due for Contracts of one kind and other. I dare say not far short of £100000. The General in some of his Trunks the day of action had Two thousand five hundred pounds all which, with much more money and private effects fell into the Enemy hands—a supply they much Wanted and an ample one it was—from Guests their was a bag of flower left here and there on the road, least any Soldiers should have been in need of it. Several stragglers have join'd us since who says they should have starv'd but for Provisions they found on the road—but report, the road was full of Dead and people dieing who with fatigue or Wounds Could move on no further; but lay down to die—this melancholy Accot Convinces, what use our Staying,
would been of, to save the life of many a poor fellow.
What we have seen, Convinces us that such an immense number of Waggons and horses will never do to be under the Care of so small a body of Troops. Col. Dunbar affirms that to avoid the Carridges he Could have had live Cattle drove—and flow'r Carried on their backs without the least trouble to the Army, except to give a Guard to the Conductors—in which Case they would have found one pound of fflower and one pound of fresh meat to each man; for within Eight pence Currency a day, where, as the Case stood, each Soldier stands for his Salt provisions and flow'r Three shillings a day & upwards upon the nearest Calculation—this is oweing to the expence of Carridge &c. The Ground was so mountainous from Wills's Creek upwards, that we were all Work'd and sweated both man and beast to get the Waggons up the hills which the horses never Could have done without the men, and be assured not withstanding it has turn'd out to so little purpose, yet it has been a most fatigueing Campaign, in a Wilderness where nothing is to be seen but wood. We have yet a pretty little march to take to Philidelphia of about 250 miles—we have brought few horses of all we had,
here, with us,they being either kill'd or Dead—and vast numbers stole
off by the Waggoners and Drivers. This is the Conclusion of the American expedition under General Braddock which was more amply provided for by the Government than any expedition of so small a number ever had been before. The truth of this is very well known to you. I'm heartily sorry I have it not in my power to give a more favourable account which might have been shorten'd if I had avoided some Circumstances—but I thought it best to be particular as they might not Come to your hand so soon—but I'm sure you'll hear all I have advanced and much more—as soon as you have opportunity of seeing any impartial person on this expedition, which will be Ninety-nine out of a hundred. |